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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of the state-level legal structure, namely the legal support for non-
competition agreements, on research productivity. Specifically, we study how California’s unique lack of 
non-competition agreement laws influences product develop when controlling for local munificence and 
firm-level technological capability. Our results indicate that California’s unique legal structure is 
negatively associated with research productivity as measured by the number of products in development 
at the time a biotechnology firm goes public. Further, firm size moderates this relationship such that the 
effect is stronger for smaller biotechnology firms.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     For decades, economists have recognized that firms in the same industry tend to cluster 
geographically. This observation has lead to a stream of research called agglomeration economics. At the 
core of agglomeration economics is the argument that firms benefit by locating within a geographic center 
of production. Transportation costs, proximity of raw materials, and access to a labor force with unique 
skills are examples of benefits accruing to firms because of clustering and are factors thought to explain 
the agglomeration of firms (Acs, FitzRoy & Smith, 1999). Krugman (1991a, b) and Marshall (1920) 
suggested that three major factors foster the creation of industry clusters: a pooled market for specialized 
labor, the development of specialized intermediate goods industries, and knowledge spillovers. 
Knowledge spillovers are defined as the benefits of knowledge to individuals or firms not responsible for 
the original creation of the knowledge (Almeida & Kogut, 1999). Knowledge consists of information and 
know-how (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Self-reinforcing expertise (Arthur, 1990) is a second model of 
regional development. In this conceptualization, geographic variance in technical progress is argued to 
exist because regions with innovative activity develop specialized resources critical to the next phase of 
innovation. Recently, Stuart and Sorenson (2003) provided evidence supporting the role of social capital 
as a creator of industry clusters. Lastly, Saxenian (1994) provided evidence that a culture of employee 
mobility supports cluster development. In each of these perspectives, knowledge spillovers play a 
particularly important role as they create competitive advantages for the firms located in the region 
through the relatively unimpeded flow of tacit knowledge. Findings that the level of relevant activity 
occurring within the firm’s geographic location complements its ongoing research (Zucker, Darby & 
Brewer, 1998b), increases its ability to develop new products (Deeds, DeCarolis & Coombs, 1999), and 
makes the firm more attractive to investors (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) (all critical outcomes for 
technology ventures) support the assertion that knowledge spillovers are especially important factors in 
industry cluster development. This literature, while highly informative and helpful in explaining why 
firms are located within a cluster, does little to explain geographically where clustering occurs or how the 
place where clustering occurs influences firm performance. In this paper, we provide one possible 
explanation, legal infrastructure, for why firms cluster where they do and test three hypotheses relating 
legal infrastructure to research performance.  
 
     Recent research by Gilson (1999) has examined the role legal infrastructure might play in facilitating 
the creation of a high technology agglomeration economy. Gilson posited that knowledge is transferred 
between firms by high employee movement, thus generating continuing innovation. He hypothesized that 
Silicon Valley’s culture was shaped by the underlying legal infrastructure and particularly the state law 
barring enforcement of employee non-competition agreements in California. A non-competition 
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agreement is defined here as an employee’s contractual promise not to engage in business similar to the 
employer’s and not to work for an employer’s competitor (Gabel & Mansfield, 2003) for a particular 
period of time (usually one or two years) and within a specific geographic region (Gilson, 1999). Many 
companies use employee non-competition agreements to manifest that management owns human capital. 
This is especially true in high technology industries where much of a firm’s competitive advantage is in 
the form of tacit knowledge that is developed over time through hands-on experience and interactions 
with other researchers, customers, and suppliers (Gilson, 1999; Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 1998a). 
From the employer’s perspective, they have an obvious competitive interest in protecting this tacit 
knowledge and in keeping it from spilling over to competitors (Gilson, 1999). California is the only state 
in the nation where these agreements are void on public policy grounds (Gabel & Mansfield, 2003; 
Gilson, 1999; Kovach, Pruett, Samuels & Duvall, 2004). 
        
     If Gilson is correct, then we might expect differences in the enforceability of employee non-
competition agreements to lead to differences in the “relative successes” of high technology-based 
geographic economies. Wood (2000) tested this relationship by comparing the law regarding covenants 
not to compete in four high technology centers: Silicon Valley, the Route 128 Corridor in Boston, Austin, 
Texas, and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. Significantly, employee non-competition 
agreements are not banned in Massachusetts, Texas or North Carolina. In Massachusetts, courts generally 
favor enforcement of such agreements. Although the courts in Texas are reluctant to enforce these 
covenants, Texas “technically” can enforce them. North Carolina’s “counter-balancing” peculiarities 
create a favorable enforcement environment for these agreements. Wood used various economic and 
financial data to objectively examine the relative recent successes or failures of the four regions, but did 
not find correlation between high technology success in these clusters and the degree to which these four 
states enforce employee covenants not to compete (2000). Despite significant legal infrastructure 
differences between the regions, they all seemed to be experiencing exponential growth and success. 
 
Non-Competition Covenants and Research Productivity 
 
     While much has been made of the importance of employee migration as a catalyst for entrepreneurial 
activity (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Audretsch & Lehmann, 2005; Saxenian, 1994) and knowledge transfer 
(Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Song, Almeida & Wu, 2003), relatively little 
mention has been made of the tacit knowledge loss firms sustain when employees leave. According to the 
resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), firms differ in their 
stocks of resources, resource heterogeneity has a strong influence on performance differentials, and those 
resources that are valuable and rare, such as tacit knowledge, are associated with superior performance 
(Berman, Down & Hill, 2002). Resource based scholars suggest that socially complex tacit knowledge, 
due to its inimitable and non-codifiable nature, is a source of competitive advantage that can sustained for 
a period of time (Barney, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Reed & DeFillippi, 
1990; Teece, 1982; Teece & Pisano, 1998). It is precisely because tacit knowledge cannot be sold through 
a market mechanism but instead resides in an individual or group, that it is the basis for sustained 
competitive advantage. 
 
While tacit knowledge may be viewed as a source of sustainable competitive advantage, how this 
knowledge comes into being is unclear. Dierickx and Cool (1989) suggest that resources are stocks of 
assets that have accumulated over time. Berman and colleagues (2002) suggest then that tacit knowledge 
accumulates over time and with experience. For firm, this suggests that it is advantageous to keep 
employees as they are a firm’s primary source of tacit knowledge. In other words, if employees leave 
frequently firms are disadvantaged in two ways. First, the employee takes with them any the tacit 
knowledge they have. Second, firms cannot immediately replace this tacit knowledge because it only 
develops over time. Even if the firm hires an employee to replace the one lost, it will take some time to 
develop the group level tacit knowledge that was lost when the employee left. In California, where non-
competition agreements are not enforced, employees may and do leave firms regularly, often to start new 
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firm of their own (Gilson, 1999). While this may positively influence start-up activity in California, we 
suggest that it is negatively related to firms’ research productivity. Thus: 
 
H1: Being located in California is negatively associated with research productivity. 
 
Moderating Role of Firm Age 
 
     The effect of state-level legal structure on research productivity is particularly strong for younger and 
smaller firms because these firms have not typically developed the qualities associated with legitimate 
firms (Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Empirically, researchers have shown that a firm’s early years of 
existence are the most tenuous in terms of survival (Henderson, 1999) due to the liability of newness. 
(Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). Young 
firms are more likely to fail because they must divert scarce resources away from operations to attract and 
train employees, develop routines and develop credible relationships. Further, these firms are more likely 
to be concerned with resolving important strategic issues such as determining which opportunities to 
pursue, selecting a competitive strategy, choosing methods of strategy implementation, and establishing 
strategic control mechanisms (Stinchcombe, 1965) for the first time. At the same time, managers in newer 
organizations are less likely to engage in formal strategic planning or thorough environmental scanning. 
As a result, they may have less knowledge of external environmental factors, when compared with 
executives of older organizations. This is largely due to a lack of managerial and analytical resources 
available to younger firms (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993). It is noteworthy when young firms are able to 
maintain operations while also building internal resource and forming credible exchange relationships. 
Due to the lack of routines and strategic planning as well as the limited time the firm has had to develop 
tacit knowledge, we suggest that younger firms are more likely to be negatively impacted by the legal 
structure in California relative to non-competition agreements than are more established firms. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the relationship between legal structure and research productivity is influenced by firm 
age. 
 
H2: Firm age moderates the relationship between being located in California and research 
productivity such that the relationship is more negative for younger firms. 
 
Moderating Role of Firm Size 
 
     Similar to younger firms, smaller firms have also been shown to operate at a relative disadvantage 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Comparatively little is known about the quality and future performance of 
small firms (Stuart, 2000). External actors such as customers, suppliers, employees, investors, and 
research partners tend to prefer interacting with larger established firms because the reliability and ability 
of larger firms is well known (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart, 2000). As with 
young firms, it is noteworthy when small firms are able to maintain operations while also building 
internal resource and forming credible exchange relationships. Small firms, therefore, typically lack these 
capabilities and may have limited resources with which to develop tacit knowledge. We therefore 
hypothesize that the relationship between legal structure and research productivity is influenced by firm 
size. 
 
H3: Firm age moderates the relationship between being located in California and research 
productivity such that the relationship is more negative for smaller firms. 
 
METHOD 
 
Sample 
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     Because they (1) may suffer from the liabilities of newness and smallness, (2) have difficulty 
establishing their legitimacy, and (3) must manage relationships with needed external resources to reduce 
their uncertainty, we chose to study biotechnology firms to test the hypothesized relationships. In slightly 
different words, we believe that the biotechnology industry provides an appropriate milieu for the study of 
the relationships among state-level legal structure and research productivity. The primary reason for this 
is that firms in this industry are relatively young with minimal resources required to support costly and 
highly uncertain product development efforts. 
 
     Our target sample was the population of human therapeutic biotechnology firms that went public 
between 1982 and 1999. Each firm that went public prior to 1996 was identified using Bioscan. Each firm 
was contacted and a prospectus describing its initial public offering (IPO) of stock was requested. 
Prospectuses for those firms that went public after 1995 were identified using Bioscan and recap.com and 
were collected from Edgar, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s publicly available database. One 
hundred and eighty seven prospectuses were collected. Due to missing data or the inclusion of warrants in 
a parent firm, twenty firms were excluded from the data set, yielding a final data set of 167 firms.  
 
     We collected data from each firm’s prospectus for its initial public offering of stock and from Ernst & 
Young’s annual reports on the biotechnology industry. To test for potential biases in the sample collected 
prior to 1996, we compared the average total assets and total liabilities as reported by Burrill and Lee 
(1993) for the population of public biotechnology firms. The firms in our sample that went public prior to 
1996 had an average of $11,708,000 in total assets and $3,569,000 in total liabilities. Burrill and Lee 
(1993) reported the average total assets and total liabilities for all 225 public biotechnology firms in 1992 
as $11,377,000 and $3,313,000 respectively. Based on this comparison of total assets and total liabilities, 
the sample of firms included in this study that went public prior to 1995 is not significantly different from 
the population of publicly traded biotechnology companies prior to 1995. In addition, by selecting firms 
from a single industry, we controlled for potential industry effects (Dess, Ireland & Hitt, 1990).  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
     Research productivity is a count variable representing a limited range of positive integer variables 
including multiple zero values, and is not normally distributed. Ordinary least squares regression 
techniques are inappropriate for this type of data. Poisson and negative binomial regression handle this 
type of data well. The presence of overdispersion in this type of data supports the use of negative 
binomial regression while the lack of overdispersion favors poisson regression (Hausman, Hall, & 
Griliches, 1984; Welbourne & Trevor, 2000). Comparing the likelihood ratios of the two models at one 
degree of freedom indicates that the poisson model is appropriate for our data (Cameron & Trevedi, 1986; 
Welbourne & Trevor, 2000). The prospectus of each firm lists those products in clinical trials and those 
that have been approved for sale. The measure we used included products in pre-clinical trials, those in 
formal FDA clinical trials, and those approved for sale. This measure is thus the most comprehensive 
measure of research productivity as applied to products available. Multiple applications of the same 
product were not included. 
 
Independent Variable 
 
     The state-level legal structure examined in this study is the legal support for employee non-
competition agreements. As a matter of law, California is the only state in the United States that does not 
recognize the legality of employee non-competition agreements. The remaining 49 states vary with the 
degree to which courts support these agreements, however, in general these remaining state courts do 
recognize these agreements as legal (Gilson, 1999). Our independent variable then is a dichotomous 
variable where 1 is coded as the firm is headquartered in California and 0 if the firm is headquartered 
elsewhere. 
 
Control Variables 
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      We considered including a number of control variables. Based on the literature, we chose to control for 
firm size and age, scientific competency, alliance activity, firm location, firm location squared, and 
research connectedness. Firm age is defined as the age of the firm in years from founding to the firm’s 
IPO. Age serves as a proxy for uncertainty because younger firms have had limited time to develop tacit 
knowledge (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). Following Deeds, Mang and Frandsen (2004), the number of 
employees is used to control for the effect of firm size on research productivity. Patents are considered 
indicators of important technology positions and innovative activity and can also be considered as inputs 
in the new product development process (Mansfield, 1977; Pakes, 1985). From the offering firm’s 
prospectus, a count of the patents both granted directly to the firm and patents in which the firm is the 
sole licensee is taken. A raw count of patents provides a reasonable alternative to a quality adjusted 
measure of patents by citations since prior research has shown that a firm’s raw patent count is highly 
correlated with the quality of its patents (Stuart, 2000). Moreover, in the biotechnology industry, patent 
counts as a proxy for innovativeness may actually be preferred over patent citation measures since 
citations occur over time and thus, are biased towards older patents. Firm R&D represents both 
knowledge that is available only to the organization that produced it and knowledge accrued from 
spillovers from R&D expenditures other firms in the same or related industries have made (Acs & 
Audretsch, 1989; Jaffe, 1986; Ziegler, 1985). R&D intensity is measured as R&D expenditures during the 
year prior to each firm’s IPO as a percentage of total firm expenditures (Deeds et al., 1997). Traditionally, 
R&D intensity is measured as R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales (Hansen & Hill, 1991). 
However, given the early stage of development of the firms in this industry, and their lack of revenues, 
total expenditures are used in place of sales. Data were collected from firm prospectuses. Recent research 
has investigated the role of alliances in knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 2001; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 
1996; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and has noted that alliances may be appropriate conduits for 
the transfer and development of knowledge (Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996) especially when firms are 
geographically proximate (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). We control for this potential source of 
knowledge transfer by including the total number of alliances each firm has been involved in from 
founding to IPO as listed in the prospectus. 
 
     A firm location factor was developed based on prior research (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Zucker et al., 
1998b) to capture a number of location measures important to biotechnology firms’ research productivity. 
The factor included the following variables: Department Rank, Medical Schools, Venture Capital, and 
Biotech Firms. Department rank is coded as the number of universities with top quality biotech-relevant 
departments in each firm’s SMA during the year the firm went public. The data for this variable come 
from two National Research Council surveys (completed in 1982 and 1993) of doctorate granting science 
departments. The sample was split into those firms going public up to and including 1988 and those firms 
going public after 1988. Thus, we used the survey results that were reported closest to the year of each 
firm’s IPO. We also analyzed the data using only the 1982 survey and then analyzed the data using only 
the 1993 survey. The department rank variable’s results were not significantly altered using either data 
source. This variable is coded as the number of universities within each firm’s SMA that is rated at 4.0 or 
higher in at least one biotech-relevant department in a given year. Medical schools is coded as the number 
of top ten medical schools in each firm’s SMA. Data were collected from annual issues of the Gourman 
Report. Venture capital is coded as the number of venture capital firms in each biotechnology firm’s 
SMA having a stated industry preference in biotechnology as reported in annual issues of Pratt’s Guide to 
Venture Capital. The biotech firm variable equals the percentage of the total industry’s biotechnology 
firms located in each biotechnology firm’s SMA. This data was collected from Ernst & Young’s annual 
reports on the biotechnology industry.  
 
     The connectedness measure was adopted from Cockburn and Henderson’s (1998) work. Publication 
information was collected for each firm for the period from firm incorporation to the IPO date. Publications 
included those indexed in the Institute for Scientific Information’s Science Citation Index. Consistent with 
Cockburn and Henderson (1998), authors’ mailing addresses were used to identify institutions involved in 
collaborations. Multiple addresses from the same institution were collapsed into one instance of 
5
Coombs and Taylor: RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 2006
collaboration. For example, a record with three authors and two Harvard University addresses was classified 
as one instance of university collaboration. The connectedness measure was developed by first classifying 
each publication’s addresses into one of the following classes: self, university, NIH, public, private, 
nonprofit, hospital, and unclassified. Self refers to papers where only addresses of the focal firm (or its 
divisions and subsidiaries) are listed. University includes university and medical school addresses. NIH 
includes any NIH or affiliated (e.g., National Institute on Aging) addresses. Public addresses include 
those associated with National Laboratories, Departments of Public Health, and other government 
departments. The hospital category includes hospitals, clinics, and community health centers. Nonprofit 
addresses are those associated with research centers and institutes, foundations, and other non-profit but 
not government affiliated offices. The private category includes for-profit private organizations such as 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. Unclassified includes any organization we were unable to 
classify. This data set included two unclassified addresses, each of which was an individual’s private 
address. For the purposes of this study, each classification was divided into its local (at the SMA level), 
domestic non-local, and international components. Thus, the measures used in this research represent firm 
connectedness at the local, domestic, and international levels. 
 
RESULTS 
 
     The average firm in our sample had 3.28 products, was 6.18 years old, and had 87.70 employees. Our 
firms were located in SMAs with an average location factor score of 0.00. For comparison, firms in our 
sample located in San Francisco, Boston, Atlanta, and Philadelphia had average location factor scores of 
8.24, 4.68, -3.83, and –1.44, respectively. The average location squared score was 13.11. The average 
firm in our sample had 6.70 patents, spent 66% of their expenditures on R&D activities, and had been 
involved in 5.34 alliances. Firms in the sample had an average of 4.14 local connections. 
 
     Table 1 presents the results of the poisson regression analyses with research productivity as the 
dependent variable. Three different models were run. Model 1 presents the base case controlling for firm 
age, firm size, patents, R&D intensity, total alliances, firm location, location squared, and local 
connectedness. The results indicate that firm size is negatively associated with research productivity (p<.01). 
The results also show that patents held by the firm (p<.01), location (p<.05), and local connectedness 
(p<.001) were all positively associated with research productivity. Location squared was negative and 
significant (p<.001). The second model incorporates the state-level legal structure variable (California). As 
predicted in hypothesis 1, California was negatively and significantly (p<.001) associated with research 
productivity. Thus, hypothesis one was supported. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested in Model 3 by 
introducing the interactions between California and firm age as well as California and firm size. The 
interaction of California and firm age, although in the predicted direction, was not significant and thus failed 
to support hypothesis 2. Lastly, the interaction between California and firm size was examined. The 
interaction is negative and significant (p<.05) and therefore provides support for hypothesis 3. The main 
effects for California remained negative and significant (p<.001) when the interaction terms were added to 
the regression equation. Our results are consistent with prior findings of a non-linear relationship between 
the amount of activity in a local area and a firm’s research productivity. In reviewing the results, we find 
strong support for both Hypotheses 1 and 3, but no support for Hypotheses 2. This indicates that state-level 
legal structure has a significant impact on firm-level research productivity by providing firms outside of 
California a means to protect the tacit knowledge held by their employees. Our results also indicate that 
firms in clusters and firms connected to their local scientific community through article co-authorship are 
significantly more research productive.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
     Schumpeter (1942) observed the importance of understanding conditions that create opportunities for, 
support, or impede entrepreneurial activity. For economies, understanding these conditions is an important 
policy issue while for individual firms, having this understanding is critical to efforts to achieve competitive 
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success. Our results shed light on these important issues by contributing to the burgeoning stream of 
research on firm-level research productivity.  
 
     Building on prior legal research (Gabel & Mansfield, 2003; Gilson, 1999; Kovach et al., 2004; Wood, 
2000), we argued that state-level legal structure relating to employee non-competition agreements would 
impact firm-level research productivity by either allowing employees to leave firms with no restrictions on 
their post-employment activities or by restricting employee actions during a period of time and/or within a 
geographic region. Our results suggest that the legal structure in California that places no restrictions on 
post-employment activities hinders firm’s research and development activities. We believe this occurs 
because firms cannot protect the tacit knowledge held by employees. We also considered the issues of 
whether legal structure was more important to younger and smaller firms. Our results here suggest that 
smaller firms are particularly affected by the legal structure in California. The results clearly highlight the 
importance of legal structure when firms are particularly reliant upon competitive advantages based upon 
tacit knowledge. We also provided support for prior research that has shown a non-linear relationship 
between firm location munificence and firm performance. Firm location is positively associated with 
research productivity up to a point. At that point, the increased competition for resources negatively impacts 
a firm’s research and product development efforts. We also support prior research by Zucker and Darby 
(1998a) and Cockburn and Henderson (1998) that suggests the importance of being connected to local 
knowledge sources rather than simply waiting for knowledge to spill over from other firms.  
 
     While highlighting the influence state-level legal structure has on research productivity, this study’s 
results are limited by a focus on the biotechnology industry. While there are methodological advantages to 
studying a single industry (Dess et al., 1990), the results must be viewed conservatively. We also use a 
limited number of variables in our location construct. Other variables such as biotechnology employment 
would be welcome additions to the measure. Finding this data at the SMA level, however, has proved 
difficult. Lastly, there are certainly other ways to keep employees from leaving and taking their tacit 
knowledge with them including compensation structure and job design. Ideally, these could be controlled 
for but, again, data availability is problematic. 
 
Finally, we would like to add some suggestions for future research. In this paper we do not control 
for other state-level legal issues that may have a bearing on employee migration. Our focus here is on 
research productivity. Future research may be directed at relating legal structure to other performance 
measure such as survival, time to IPO, and patent development. For entrepreneurs, this research suggests 
that state-level legal issues should be considered when deciding where to locate their firms if knowledge 
protection is central to competitive advantage. 
 
CONTACT: Joseph E. Coombs; Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 
77843-4221; (T): 804-287-6631; (F): 804-289-8878; jcoombs@tamu.edu. 
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Table 1 
Poisson Regression Results for Research Productivity 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm Age -0.013 -0.018 -0.017 
Firm Size -0.003
** 
-0.003
** 
-0.002
* 
Patents 0.007
** 
0.007
** 
0.006
** 
R&D Intensity -0.107
 
-0.126
 
-0.127
 
Total Alliances -0.014
 
-0.016
† 
-0.015
† 
Location 0.029
* 
0.033
* 
0.030
* 
Location Squared -0.024
*** 
-0.014
* 
-0.014
* 
Local Connectedness 0.021
*** 
0.021
*** 
0.022
*** 
California  -0.174
*** 
-0.216
*** 
California x Age  
 
-0.007 
California x Size  
 
-0.002
* 
Pearson Ch-Square
 
755.73 669.83 653.19 
Log Likelihood 138.96
 
158.87
 
161.64
 
N 167 161 159 
 
†
p<.10, 
*
p<.05, 
**
p<.01, 
***
p<.001 
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